This article analyzes the consequences of integration in public education. I
Introduction
A long line of the research has overwhelmingly shown that white students' choice between public and private schools is influenced by the racial composition of the local student population. Thus, in the US, starting from the 1970s, numerous studies, such as, for example, Clotfelter (1976; , Coleman, Hoffer and Kilgore (1982) , Conlon and Kimenyi (1991) , Andrews (2002) , Fairlie and Resch (2002) , Reber (2005) , Lankford and Wyckoff (2006) , among others, presented evidence of White Flight from the integrated multicultural public schools with large concentrations of black or minority children into more segregated private education.
1 Fairlie (2002) has provided evidence of the "Latino Flight" from the blacks that is not significantly different from the flight of whites. Finally, Betts and Fairlie (2003) found evidence of the "Native Flight" from minority immigrants.
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Outside the United States, the desire of white parents to have their children educated in predominantly white schools has been well documented, for example, in the United Kingdom (Bagley 1996) . Within this context, it has been also argued that higher levels of family income and parental education have a strong positive effect on the probability that children will attend private schools (Lankford and Wyckoff 2001; Betts and Fairlie 2001; Fairlie 2002; Fairlie and Resch 2002; Epple et al. 2004 ).
Although no consensus has been reached in the literature on the causes of the flight, the authors of these studies speculate that White Flight occurs due to the use of the racial composition of the school as a signal of academic quality in response to a lack of other measures of quality. A more extensive list of the reasons include, for instance, expectations about poor management of schools where large groups of minority children are enrolled, lower level of discipline in multiethnic classes, peer group effect of a less advantaged school-student population, the desire to avoid contacts with juveniles with 1 Although flight to another, less desegregated, public school may also be an option (Reber 2005) , as Lankford and Wyckoff (2006) note, in the areas where the open enrollment plans have been established to achieve desegregation, the public school choice available to parents is quite limited. As they note, whites living in school attendance areas having relatively "too few" whites in the local public school have no public school choice at all. 2 Very high rates of private school attendance have been also observed among the US-born Asians (Betts and Fairlie 2001; Fairlie and Resch 2002) . supposingly higher problem behavior, 3 parental fear that teachers may decide to spend additional time helping minority students with limited proficiency in the mainstream language at the expense of other students in the classroom or that the presence of the students with limited language proficiency in public school may lead to wholesale changes in teaching methods used for all students. 4 For any reason that causes parents to expect that multicultural integration in public school is likely to reduce their children's acquisition of human capital, the effect of integration is the same, and this paper is about the effect, not about the reasons. In any case, it has been decisively demonstrated that the racial composition of suburban public schools appears to be the key in explaining why, as compared to white urban families, relatively few suburban families send their children to private schools (Lankford and Wyckoff 2006) .
I discuss the issue in the context of a model with endogenous fertility building on Azarnert (2006; 2010a) that is related to the literature on endogenous fertility and growth. 5 The prediction of the present model that opting out of public education to the expensive private education, which increases the cost of having children, is associated with a reduction in fertility is consistent with the traditional theory of endogenous fertility, which implies that any increase in the cost of rearing children leads to a lower fertility choice. Among empirical studies, Lankford and Wyckoff (2001) demonstrated that the choice of private education for children is associated with lower number of children within the family. De la Croix and Doepke (2009) also found some empirical support for their hypothesis that parents who choose public schools for their offspring have more children than parents who choose costly private schools. Equipped with these findings of the previous theoretical and empirical literature, the present work enriches the analysis with a novel channel, through which public education policy can generate a different effect on the level of fertility among groups that differ from each other with respect to their average rates of participation in public education.
In this paper, I assume that the basic amount of education provided in public school is financed by taxes levied outside the economic environment that is being examined and thereby is free for families. 6 This simplification assumption allows us to abstract from the negative effect of taxation on individuals' decisions with respect to the optimal investments in the quantity and quality of their offspring 7 and concentrate on the pure effect of the multicultural integration in public education. It is also consistent with the situation after the school finance reform that launched in the mid-1970s in the US, where governmental grants to schools are now often provided at a simple per-student base (Card and Payne 2002) . Assuming that public schools are financed by an endogenously determined tax, 8 which implies a reallocation of resources from the rich, who can resort to the White Flight strategy, to the poor, will increase the threshold level of income (human capital), above which parents decide in favor of opting out of public education, without altering the qualitative nature of this paper's results.
The basic idea of this paper may be stated as follows. Assume an economy populated by two different groups: A-type individuals and B-type individuals. 9 Assume that for some reason, for instance, expectations about poor management of schools where large groups of minority children are enrolled, low level of discipline in multiethnic classes, peer group effect of a less advantaged student population, or simply general difficulties for teaching in more heterogeneous classes, A-type parents expect that in the integrated school their children will not devote their entire time to the acquisition of human capital. If parents expect that in the integrated school their children are likely to spend a fraction of their time unproductively, this generates an incentive to opt out and 6 In this case the particular tax levied in order to finance public education is irrelevant for the analysis. For example, it could be a lump sum tax or a local property tax along with direct aid received exogenously from the government (as e.g. in Nechyba 2003); cf. also Azarnert (2010a; 2010b) . 7 The disincentive effect of taxation has been well recognized in the literature (see Azarnert (2004) 
The Basic Structure of the Model
Consider an overlapping-generations economy, in which activity extends over an infinite discrete time. In every period the economy produces a single homogenous good using a In Sections 2.1 to 2.5, the analysis concentrates on the results of the integration policy in public education for A-type individuals only. In section 2.6, I analyze the results of the integration policy for B-type individuals. Next, in Section 2.7, I discuss the effect of the integration policy on the average level of human capital in the society as a whole.
Human Capital Production
In the first period of life children are endowed with one unit of time. In the exclusive private school children devote their entire time to the acquisition of human capital. In the integrated public school children spend a fraction
of their time unproductively, as follows from, for example, poor management of schools where large groups of minority children are enrolled, lower level of discipline in integrated classes, peer group effect of a less advanced student population, general difficulties for teaching in more heterogeneous classes, or simply a perceived threat from B-type school students with supposingly different norms of behavior. As a result, they devote to the acquisition of human capital a fraction  of their time only;
. Therefore, the variable  is inversely related to the fraction of B-type school students in the integrated school;
In the public school a certain amount of human capital -equal for all children -is provided at zero cost for their parents. This basic public education is assumed to be financed by taxes levied outside the economic environment that is being examined. In addition, to increase their children's human capital levels, parents supplement this basic public educational expenditure with their own private investments in their children's human capital. In the exclusive private school all the costs of the acquisition of human capital are assumed to be financed by parents themselves.
The human capital level of a child, who becomes an adult at period 1
therefore an increasing function of the public per-child expenditure ( ) if a child acquires education in the public school, the parental real expenditure on the child's education in private or public school in period t ( t e ), as well as the child's time investment ( ):
A particular form of human capital production function is specified below in Eq. (8).
The Optimization of Parents
Under both scenarios (in the case of flight from public school and in the case of no flight from public school), agents derive utility from their own consumption in adulthood and from the total future income of their children. The utility function of an individual born at
where t C is an individual's own consumption, while the total future income of the individual's offspring is:
The right-hand side of Eq. (3) represents an adult's income, which is allocated between consumption and the total cost of rearing children. Under each scenario with a single factor of production.
Quantity -Quality Tradeoff
From optimization, regardless of the choice of public or private education for his children, an adult's consumption is
That is, a fraction   1 of an adult's full income is devoted to consumption and hence a fraction  is devoted to childrearing.
In order to allocate resources between children's quantity and quality, an adult makes two simultaneous decisions. First, he decides how much consumption to forego during his adulthood to rear a family. Second, he decides what amount of resources to invest privately in the education of his children to increase their skill level. 10 The time constraint requires that . From Eq. (6), optimization with respect to child's quality thus implies that
The next subsection discusses the solution for the parents' optimization problem for a particular form of the human capital production function and analyzes the effect of integration in public education on parental educational expenditures, children's human capital levels and fertility.
Choice of Fertility and Investment in Education
To characterize optimal choices of fertility and investment in schooling, suppose that public and private schools have access to the same technology of human capital production:
In this particular learning technology the variable  captures the major difference between the integrated and exclusive education. As has been assumed in Section 2.1, in the exclusive school, children devote their entire unit of time to the acquisition of human capital ( 1   ), whereas in the integrated multicultural school they devote a fraction  of their unit of time only
The difference between public and private education is captured here by the variable  that measures the level of public educational expenditures per child in the public school ( 0   ), which in this work are assumed to be financed by taxes levied outside the model. In contrast, all of the expenditures in the private school are financed by parents themselves, so that in the case of the private school 0   . Given the differences between public and private education, as captured by  and  , this human capital production technology can be re-formulated as: so that, according to (7),
Given the amount of resources allocated to children's education in each of the cases, the desired fertility is
The following lemma summarizes the main result concerning the effect of White Flight on A-type individuals' expenditures on the education of their children, the children's human capital levels and fertility. Recall that, on the one hand, a significant fraction of the expenditures in the integrated public school is financed by the government, whereas all the expenditures in the exclusive private school are financed by parents themselves. As a result, a certain amount of children's education in the integrated public school is provided for free for parents. On the other hand, in the integrated public school, children devote less time to the acquisition of skills.
In order to establish conditions that lead to the choice of flight over no flight, compare the levels of parental utility derived under both scenarios. As long as
it is optimal to remain in the integrated public school. Once this inequality is reversed, it is optimal to leave public school in favor of the exclusive private education. From optimization, as determined in Eq. (5), adults' consumption remains unaffected whether their children attend public school, or opt out for private education. Therefore, the level of parental utility in the case of flight ( ). From Eq. (4), given the optimal levels of fertility and the children's human capital, as shown in Eqs. (10) and (11),
Given Eq. (12), Proposition 1 determines precisely when it is optimal to send children to the multicultural public school and when it is optimal to opt out and educate children in the exclusive private school.
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Proposition 1: For parents with human capital levels below the threshold
, the no-flight strategy is optimal, whereas for parents with human capital levels above that threshold, the flight strategy is optimal.
Proof. Substituting the optimal levels of t C ,
and
Therefore, this allows us to summarize the major effect of the multicultural integration in public education on the number and human capital levels of children that have been born to A-type parents with different levels of human capital.
Proposition 2: (1) Multicultural integration in public education that causes relatively skilled (wealthy) parents with human capital levels above ĥ to resort to private education
decreases fertility among these parents with human capital levels above ĥ .
Proof. Proposition (1) in conjunction with Lemma 1(3). (2) In contrast, among relatively less skilled (poor) parents with human capital levels below ĥ , who cannot afford private education for their offspring, multicultural integration in public education decreases their children's human capital levels.
Proof. Proposition (1) in conjunction with Eq. (10), if
Therefore, the integration policy in public education that has been designed for the benefit of less advantaged B-type children generates a negative effect on the opportunities of the other weak segment of society: the offspring of the A-type poor.
Given that for parents with human capital levels above ĥ their resort to the flight strategy implies an increase in the private parental expenditures on their children's education that, although at the expense of a reduction in the number of children, more than offsets the lost public education, this also allows us to shed new light on the effect of the integration on inequality among A-type individuals.
Proposition 3: Multicultural integration in public education increases inequality among A-type individuals in the children's generation.
Proof. Proposition (1) in conjunction with Lemma 1(2).
In particular, comparing the actual level of human capital acquired by the offspring of the A-type poor in the integrated public school, as shown in Eq. (10) 
In addition, in view of the positive relationship between the parental human capital levels and their children's human capital levels, as shown in Eq. (10), this effect of integration on inequality between the offspring of the A-type rich and the poor may have long-lasting consequences.
12 Notice that from Eq. (12), it is immediately clear that in the potential case of no integration in public education ( 1   ), it is optimal for everyone to remain in the public school. Clearly, since the wage per one unit of human capital is fixed in this model, the above equation also implies that the fraction of the total potential human capital of an Atype individual's children that has been lost due to integration is the same as the fraction of the total children's human capital.
Therefore, given Eq. (15), I emphasize that:
Proposition 4: The fraction of total potential income (human capital) of an A-type individual's children that has been lost due to integration is higher among parents with
human capital levels below ĥ than among parents with human capital levels above ĥ , and among the latter it is higher the lower is the individual's level of human capital.
Proof. Note that for any
Therefore, this allows us to conclude that among A-type individuals the poor, who cannot afford to avoid integration, incur the greater costs than the rich, who can resort to private education. This result may partly explain why negative sentiments toward several minorities are particularly strong among the less educated, as has been widely argued.
B-type Individuals
In this section, I introduce B-type individuals and analyze the effect of the integration in public education on this group of population.
Recall that in this model the difference between the two types of population stems from:
(1) Different norms of behavior of B-type school students, The "B-type-only" public school has access to the same technology of human capital production, as shown in Eq. (8), so that the amount of human capital acquired by B-type children in either school is respectively:
Since in all other respects individuals of both types are similar, the optimization problem of B-type parents is similar to the optimization problem of A-type parents, subject to the particular constraints of B-type individuals, as described above.
Therefore, following the same steps as in Sections 2.2 to 2.4, the optimal choice of a B-type individual's private investment in the children's education is
so that , (18) and the desired fertility is
From equations (17) to (19), it is clear that: Moreover, from Eq. (18), the per-child gains of human capital, as a fraction of the child's human capital level that could be acquired in the "B-type-only" school are:
Clearly, since these gains result from the positive human capital spillovers that come at a zero cost for B-type individuals, the integration policy increases the levels of their utility.
In the next section, I analyze the overall society-wide effect of the integration policy on the average level of human capital in the society as a whole and derive a condition that guarantees an increase/ decrease in the society-wide average level of human capital as a result of integration in public education.
Society as a Whole
This section examines the overall society-wide effect of the integration in public education on the average level of human capital in the society as a whole. The average human capital level in period 1  t is defined as
Given the fractions of A-type and B-type individuals in the society in period t and distinguishing A-type parents with respect to their human capital levels, the average level of the society's human capital in period 1  t in the case of integration ( 
Correspondingly, in the absence of integration, the average level of human capital
Given the number of children and the levels of human capital investment among the two types of agents, as determined in Sections 2.4 and 2.6, the human capital levels in
Comparing the level of human capital in the case of integration ( 
Conclusion
This article analyzes the consequences of integration in public education. I have used a standard model with endogenous fertility to show that the flight from integrated multicultural public schools to private education increases private educational expenditures and, as a result, decreases fertility among more affluent parents whose children flee. In contrast, among less prosperous parents, who cannot afford private education for their offspring, integration in public education decreases their children's human capital levels. I also demonstrate that the poor, who cannot afford to opt out, incur greater costs than the rich, who can resort to private education. Moreover, the human- 
